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I 
INTRODUCTION 
It can be safely considered common knowledge that it is difficult to 
consistently predict a judicial outcome. The term by which these situations are 
best described is legal uncertainty. Professor Anthony D’Amato defines legal 
uncertainty in a mathematical sense, as meaning that a legal rule is expected by 
informed attorneys to have an official outcome at or near the 0.5 level of 
predictability, which means that the outcome is barely indistinguishable from 
random prediction.1 Other definitions have been introduced, but they all refer to 
legal uncertainty as a vice.2 Legal uncertainty is routinely blamed for 
undermining both the rule of law in general and the law’s ability to achieve 
specific objectives, such as deterring anti-social conduct or encouraging trade and 
investment.3 
Research has pointed to diverse explanations for this lack of predictability, 
such as the inherent ambiguity of human language that is used to describe legal 
rules, the use of open norms (for example, the reasonable person standard in tort 
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1.   D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1983).
2.  See generally John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the
Supreme Court, 23 DUKE L.J. 59 (1974) (arguing that legal uncertainty inhibits a court’s leadership role 
and its ability to develop laws). 
3. Arnaud Raynouard & Anne-Julie Kerhuel, Measuring the Law: Legal Certainty as a Watermark,
8 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE, 360, 362 (2010). 
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claims), and a natural process of obsolescence due to continual changes in society 
and technology.4 Although each of these explanations might contribute to our 
understanding of the non-deterministic character of judicial decisions, it is useful 
to consider this phenomenon in terms of two formal principles introduced in Part 
II, Section A: incompleteness and uncertainty.5 
In this Article we put forward an alternative formulation of legal uncertainty 
that is even more mathematically oriented than the one proposed by D’Amato. 
This requires us to introduce some mathematical background, although we do so 
in a rather non-rigorous manner.6 What both conceptualizations of legal 
uncertainty have in common, however, is that they merely provide mental 
pictures. It is often impossible to predict with a high degree of accuracy the 
expected outcome of the application of a certain rule to a specific act or 
transaction, which can limit the practicability of defining legal uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the introduced analogy with mathematical function 
maximization is useful as a new conceptual definition of legal uncertainty. Even 
more importantly, once legal uncertainty is properly visualized, we argue that it 
can be reduced by a certain scheme in judicial decision-making.7 These concepts 
and ideas are then illustrated in a fictitious case study.8 
In short, the proposed way to improve judicial decision-making entails that 
the judge communicates all legally valid solutions to the litigants and, more 
broadly, to the outside world. One of the major benefits of this proposed way of 
judging cases would be the reduction of the human black box character that is 
currently present in many, if not most, judicial decision-making settings around 
the world. For example, judges typically produce a single outcome that resolves 
the case at hand, although they probably thought of other possible solutions. 
Even though these other solutions might also be legally defensible, judges restrict 
their judgment to that single outcome. Reasons for not mentioning other 
outcomes might include the fear that some alternative outcomes are socially not 
acceptable, the urge to maintain the appearance that the law is unambiguous, or 
the lack of willingness to thoroughly ascertain all legally valid solutions and 
compare them to each other. 
In contrast, black boxes from the domain of artificial intelligence are easily 
able to produce a set of alternative solutions to a given problem and produce all 
reasonable predictions in a forecast study. In the debate on the applicability of 
artificial intelligence tools in legal practice, it is frequently argued that because 
 
 4.  H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (M. Knight trans., The Lawbook Exchange 2d ed. 2009); 
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Deffains, Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process, 163 J.  INST. & 
THEORETICAL ECON., 627, 629 (2007) (arguing that the difficulty of predicting law can be attributable 
to “the natural process of obsolescence due to continual changes in society and technology . . .”). 
 5.  See infra Part II. 
 6.  See infra Part II, Section A. 
 7.  See infra Part II.B. 
 8.  See infra Part II.C. 
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most of these tools are black boxes, they are inferior to human judges.9 The given 
considerations show, however, that reality is much more nuanced, as artificial 
black boxes communicate a wide range of plausible outcomes, in contrast to most 
human judges. The central theme of this Article is as follows: If judges are 
expected to be at least as transparent as artificial black boxes, they should 
communicate all legally valid solutions to a given dispute. 
 
II 
INCOMPLETENESS AND AMBIGUITY 
Every legal practitioner has encountered the frustrating situation where the 
law does not provide a clear solution to the problem at hand. To such a person it 
is evident that law is a system that is unable to ensure a perfectly tailored legal 
solution to every dispute. 
Those with a background in mathematics may recognize the imperfections of 
the law as being the result of an incomplete system. Incompleteness was formally 
proven as a property of mathematical machinery by the famous logician, Gödel.10 
Ignoring the many technicalities underlying his proposition, Gödel essentially 
demonstrated that regardless of the number of axioms (which are statements that 
are taken to be true) introduced into the mathematical system, there will always 
exist statements that can neither be proved nor disproved. Put another way, one 
can always find claims that cannot merely be labelled true or false. The 
mathematical system is simply unable to provide any definite answer as to the 
truth or falsity of every proposition. Thus, if even the highly formalized world of 
mathematical abstractness struggles with incompleteness, how can the much less 
formal rules and principles of law hope to overcome this challenge? 
Whereas scholars Katharina Pistor and Chenggang Xu define incompleteness 
as meaning that some relevant applications of the law are missing or ambiguously 
stipulated in the law,11 we prefer the concept of incompleteness to be restrictively 
related to missingness. A simple example of incompleteness is a rule stating that 
some laws will be no longer valid as from a certain date D1, and that a new set of 
legal rules will be in force from date D2, but there is some period between D1 and 
D2 for which the rule does not stipulate which laws are applicable. 
 
 9.  Jason Tashea, Courts Are Using AI to Sentence Criminals. That Must Stop Now, WIRED (Apr. 
17, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/courts-using-ai-sentence-criminals-must-stop-now/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z74F-Y865]. (arguing that such artificial intelligence lacks transparency in its decision-
making process as compared to human judges). 
 10.  See generally TORKEL FRANZÉN, GÖDEL’S THEOREM: AN INCOMPLETE GUIDE TO ITS USE 
AND ABUSE (2005) (explaining the mathematical proof of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem). 
 11.  Chenggang Xu & Katharina Pistor, Law Enforcement Under Incomplete Law: Theory and 
Evidence form Financial Market Regulation 3 (COLUM. L. SCH. CENTER FOR LAW & ECON. STUD., 
Working Paper No. 222, 2001), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=396141 
[https://perma.cc/RGE2-AZC4]. (“Incomplete law means that some relevant applications of the law are 
missing, or that they are ambiguously stipulated in the law.”). 
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Another characteristic of some judicial rules is that they are ambiguous.12 
While ambiguity has certain similarities to incompleteness, it should be 
considered a distinct concept. Although there is no agreement on the exact 
definition of this notion,13 ambiguity is often understood as to mean that some 
rules are susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.14 Ambiguity is 
very apparent in the case of open norms, which are behavioral norms with an 
open texture, such as the norm of good faith, the prohibition of the abuse of 
power, and notions of trust and confidence.15 
Incompleteness and ambiguity are catalysts for biases in judicial decision 
making. Biases are highly prevalent in the reasoning processes of humans in 
general and of judges in particular.16 The more ambiguous or incomplete the rules 
are, the more flexibility there is to use these rules in a way that is not entirely 
rational. Ambiguity and incompleteness may, therefore, serve as an occasion for 
judges to consult their own views of policy, whether openly, quietly, or 
unconsciously.17 Judges may also use the flexibility offered by incompleteness and 
ambiguity to rationalize their decisions by strategically interpreting a legal 
standard.18 This is not to say that judges deliberately misuse the deficiencies of 
the legal system to arrive at decisions that seem illogical from a legal or rational 
point of view. Psychologists have introduced the notion of cognitive dissonance 
to explain how people hold inconsistent, sometimes even foolish, beliefs, while 
internally being convinced that their behavior relies on a rational and logical 
reasoning process.19 Even elite decision makers, such as U.S. Supreme Court 
 
 12.  Mark Moller, Procedure’s Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645, 646 (2011) (discussing various cases 
which generated “fuzzy and indeterminate” legal tests). 
 13.  See generally Ward Farnsworth, Dustin Guzior, Anup Malani, Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An 
Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 257, 257 (2010) (discussing the lack of 
consensus behind the meaning of ambiguity). 
 14.  Ambiguity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 15.  Aline Van Bever, Open Norms and the Foundations of Employment Law: A Legal Examination 
of Hidden Patterns in Employment Relationships, 3 EUR. LABOUR L. J. 173, 173 (2012). 
 16.  See generally Allison P. Harris & Maya Sen, Bias and Judging, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.  241, 259 
(2019) (finding race, gender, and ethnicity can sometimes be used to predict judicial decisions); Jenny 
Yourstone, Torum Lindholm, Martin Grann, Ola Svenson, Evidence of Gender Bias in Legal Insanity 
Evaluations: A Case Vignette Study of Clinicians, Judges and Students, 62 NORDIC J. PSYCHIATRY 273 
(2008) (finding evidence of gender bias among judges in legal insanity evaluations); Yevgeny Mugerman, 
Neta Nadiv, Moran Ofir, Are Courts Biased? The Anchoring Heuristic and Judicial Decisions in Personal 
Bankruptcy Proceedings, (May 29, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3590544 [https://perma.cc/Q2X9-YNFE] (finding a 
strong correlation between the payment plan initially recommendation and the court’s final ruling); 
Masua Sagiv, Cultural Bias in Judicial Decision Making, 35 B.C.  J. L. & SOC. JUST. 229 (2015) (finding a 
cultural bias to be present in judicial decision making). 
 17.  Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE 
L. J. 2580, 2610 (2006) (“[T]he political convictions of federal judges continue to play a role in judicial 
review of agency interpretations.”). 
 18.  John Zhuang Liu & Xueyao Li, Legal Techniques for Rationalizing Biased Judicial Decisions: 
Evidence from Experiments with Real Judges, 16 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 630, 631–32 (2019) (finding 
judges rationalize their decision making to align with their implicit biases). 
 19.  See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957) (introducing 
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Justices, are not free from cognitive dissonances.20 
The fact that any legal system is, in general, ambiguous and incomplete, does 
not imply that all cases are subject to legal uncertainty. Given a certain legal 
dispute, the set of legal rules that is feasible to resolve that specific case is a subset 
of all rules that exist within the legal system. It may well be that a specific subset 
is complete and unambiguous with respect to the case at hand. In such a situation, 
there is a clear legally permissible outcome. For example, if a person is using their 
cell phone while driving, and the law states that using a cell phone while driving 
will be punished with a fine of $50, then the set of feasible legal rules that applies 
to this case is both complete and unambiguous. Only one verdict is legally 
acceptable, and thus legal uncertainty is zero. 
However, due to the properties of incompleteness and ambiguity in the legal 
system, there exist many cases where the subset of legal rules that are feasible to 
decide the case do not result in a clear outcome. For these cases, multiple legally 
permissible decisions exist. In this Article, we argue that judges should attempt 
to describe all these potential outcomes. That is to say, judges should not only 
outline different interpretations of ambiguous rules and incomplete laws, but also 
state what the resulting judicial outcome would be under these alternative 
reasoning processes. Thus, in contrast to the many verdicts that contain a single 
decision, we propose that the final opinion of the court should contain all legally 
permissible decisions. Of course, the court should ultimately settle the dispute, 
which requires an unequivocal decision. Our proposal is not in contradiction with 
this task, as we argue that the judge should simply select the most legally valid 
outcome from the set of all legally permissible decisions. We refer to this last 
decision as the final decision. All other legally permissible decisions found by the 
judge are referred to as alternative decisions. 
The advantages of communicating a final decision with a set of alternative 
decisions are outlined below. Before elaborating on the consequences of this 
proposed method of judicial decision-making, we will conceptualize the problem 
of finding the set of legally permissible solutions for any given case. We do this 








the theory of cognitive dissonance); CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE 
(BUT NOT BY ME): WHY WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL ACTS (2015). 
 20.  See generally Paul M. Collins, Jr., Cognitive Dissonance on the U.S. Supreme Court, 64 POL. RES. 
Q. 362 (2009) (examining the applicability of dissonance theory to elite decision makers). 
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III 
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AND MATHEMATICAL FUNCTION 
MAXIMIZATION 
The problem of finding all legally permissible solutions for a given case can 
be illustrated in terms of a well-established mathematical issue, namely the task 
of finding points where a mathematical function reaches a maximum. Before 
describing this connection, it is necessary to first introduce some basic concepts 
related to mathematical functions and their maxima. 
A. Mathematical Function Maximization 
A maximum is defined as a value that is larger (or at least not smaller) than 
all other values in a neighborhood, or specific range of values. Figure 1 is an 
example of a mathematical function with one maximum. The green dot denotes 
a value that is larger than all values nearby, and thus it is a maximum. 
 



















A function can have more than one maximum, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
Although in this figure the two maxima have the same value, this need not be the 
case. The definition of maximum only requires that the corresponding value be 
larger than values nearby. 
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Figure 2. A Mathematical Function with Two Maxima 
 
Consequently, a value might be larger than all values in the immediate 
neighborhood, and thus be a maximum, although it is smaller than values further 
away. In such a case there will be multiple maxima having different values. This 
is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows a function containing nine maxima, which 
are denoted by red dots. Notice that the second maximum from the left has a 
value of zero and is much smaller than other values of the function, even values 
that are not maxima. Nonetheless, because the value is larger than values nearby, 
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It is convenient to divide the set of maxima into two sets, namely global 
maxima and local maxima. While a global maximum corresponds to the largest 
value among all values of the function, a local maximum is smaller than the global 
maximum but the largest value in the neighborhood of values. For example, in 
Figure 3, the second maximum from the left is a local maximum, while the third 
maximum is a global maximum. A function has at least one global maximum, and 
zero or more local maxima. As an example, the function that was displayed in 
Figure 2 has two global maxima, while it does not contain any local maximum. 
The figures shown so far contain a finite number of maxima, but this is not 
always the case, as demonstrated by Figure 4. This figure displays a plateau and 













 21.  Image adapted from https://brilliant.org/wiki/extrema/ [https://perma.cc/6U4E-M5L5]. 
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Figure 4. A Mathematical Function with an Infinite Number of Maxima 
 
 
For many mathematical functions, it is a non-trivial problem to locate all the 
points where that function reaches a local or global maximum.22 If the function 
can be easily plotted, then the maxima can be located by pure visual inspection, 
and thus the corresponding value can be easily determined, at least 
approximately. But for high dimensional functions, the problem becomes much 
more complex. Consider, for example, the four-dimensional Styblinski-Tang 




This is one of the many functions used as benchmarks for optimization 
algorithms.23 Because this function has four input variables and one output 
 
 22.  See e.g., Robert E. Dorsey & Walter J. Mayer, Genetic Algorithms for Estimation Problems with 
Multiple Optima, Nondifferentiability, and Other Irregular Features, 13 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 53, 66 
(1995) (examining the general algorithm method); Donald R. Jones, A Taxonomy of Global 
Optimization Methods Based on Response Surfaces, 21 J. GLOBAL OPTIMIZATION 345, 383 (2001) 
(describing classifications of global optimization methods); DAVID G. LUENBERGER, OPTIMIZATION BY 
VECTOR SPACE METHODS (1997) (analyzing different vector space methods in relation to optimization 
theory). 
 23.  See generally Igor Grigoryev & Svetlana Mustafina, Global Optimization of Functions of Several 
Variables Using Parallel Technologies, 106 INT’L J. PURE & APPLIED MATHEMATICS 301 (2016) (testing 
benchmark optimization problems); Hannan A.R. Akkar & Firas R. Mahdi, Evolutionary Algorithms 
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variable, it lives in five-dimensional space and is impossible to plot. In this case, 
it is necessary to rely on sophisticated algorithms to find the maxima, such as the 
famous Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm.24 
B. Maxima in Judicial Decision-Making 
Although perhaps not obvious at first sight, locating the maxima of a function 
is useful for conceptualizing the task of a judge ruling on a case. This is done by 
equating the solutions to a dispute with a certain mathematical function. Just as 
each function has a very specific behavior, and just as its graph differs from that 
of any other function, each dispute is unique in its own way. Disputes that slightly 
differ from each other—for example a case where person X violated the speed 
limit of fifty miles per hour by driving fifty-five miles per hour and a case where 
person Y violated the same speed limit by driving fifty-six miles per hour—would 
correspond to mathematical functions that are very similar, e.g., f(x) = x2 and g(x) 
= x2 + 0.01. We will refer to the function that corresponds to a case as the case-
function. 
The independent variable is assumed to take as values all possible solutions 
to the case, even resolutions that are not legally permissible, while the dependent 
variable corresponds to a measure of legal correctness. Only local maxima are 
considered legally permissible. This means that outcomes close to, but still 
different from, a local maximum, are, in a certain sense, close to a legally valid 
solution. For example, if in a certain dispute the law stipulates that compensation 
between 500 and 1000 euros may be awarded, all compensations ranging from 
500 to 1000 euros will be maxima of the case-function. A compensation of 1001 
euros will not correspond to a maximum, but it is literally close to the case 
function maximum corresponding to 1000 euros. Values that are gradually larger 
than 1000 euros correspond to gradually smaller values of the dependent 
variable. 
Obviously, this conceptualization is merely a mental picture of a process that 
is very different in nature. Yet, the visualization of a case by a function is useful 
in many respects. In particular, each maximum of the case-function can be 
interpreted as a legally valid solution. The simple case above, where a person is 
using his cell phone while driving, might be associated with the function that was 
shown in Figure 1. This function has one maximum, corresponding to the single 
legally permissible judicial decision. More generally, a case for which the subset 
of applicable legal rules is unambiguous and complete corresponds to a function 
with a unique maximum. Cases to which ambiguous or incomplete rules apply 
 
Performance Comparison for Optimizing Unimodal and Multimodal Test Functions, 5 INT’L J. SCI. & 
TECH. RES. 38, 45 (2016). 
 24.  See generally Donald W. Marquardt, An Algorithm for Least-Squares Estimation of Nonlinear 
Parameters, 11 J. SOC’Y FOR INDUS. & APPLIED MATHEMATICS 431, 441 (1963) (developing the 
maximum neighborhood method and applying it to solving nonlinear algebraic equations); Kenneth 
Levenberg, A Method for the Solution of Certain Nonlinear Problems in Least Squares, 2 Q. APPLIED 
MATHEMATICS 164, 166 (1944) (explaining a solution to some non-linear problems in least squares). 
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may be associated with functions having multiple maxima. A global maximum 
then corresponds to a verdict that is legally best, while a local maximum is also 
legally valid but is, in some sense, inferior to a global maximum solution, perhaps 
because it relies on a minority opinion among the judiciary. 
A function with a plateau, as is shown in Figure 4, is also useful to describe 
cases with quantifiable outcomes. For example, a plaintiff may be granted 
compensation due to a breach of contract by a defendant, but it is typically 
impossible to compute the exact loss of a plaintiff’s future earnings owed as 
damages.25 The case-function will then contain a plateau, where each value of the 
plateau corresponds to a specific amount of compensation that might be granted 
under the applicable legal rules. This plateau may be represented as an interval 
[a,b] where a denotes the compensation that should at the very least be granted, 
while b represents the largest amount that can be granted in accordance with the 
given facts and the law. Every amount between a and b is legally valid. As another 
example, in a criminal procedure there might be a plateau representing the length 
of imprisonment accorded to a guilty verdict. There will also be a local maximum 
corresponding to the verdict of not guilty. If there is convincing evidence that the 
accused is guilty, the plateau will correspond to a larger value than the local 
maximum that corresponds to the non-guilty case. If, however, the standard of 
proof would not be met, the plateau will be located below the non-guilty local 
maximum. An interesting question is whether the height of the case-function 
could be used as a concrete measure of the standard of proof. This is, however, a 
question that is outside the scope of the current Article, since in this work the 
focus is on the local maxima. It is also possible for a case-function to contain 
multiple plateaus, some of which may contain global maxima, while others may 
correspond to local maxima. 
It is reasonable to expect that case-functions with many maxima are prone to 
appeal, as judges will have selected a single maximum as the final decision, 
although they might have selected other maxima. An appellant is basically hoping 
that the court of appeal will select one of these other maxima. Furthermore, the 
value of the selected maximum will also influence the probability that one of the 
parties will lodge an appeal. If the judge has selected a local maximum with a very 
low value, such as the local maximum with value zero in Figure 2, parties will be 
more keen to lodge an appeal than in the case the judge selects a maximum with 
a much higher value. Even for case-functions where a global maximum has been 
selected as final decision, it is still quite possible that a party will lodge an appeal. 
This holds in particular for case-functions with multiple global maxima, such as 
case-functions with a plateau. In this case, the party that is lodging an appeal is 
hoping that the appellate court will select one of the other global maxima. 
 
 
 25.  Elmer J. Schaefer, Uncertainty and the Law of Damages, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 719, 719 
(1978). 
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IV 
IMPROVING JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING BY FINDING AND COMMUNICATING 
ALL MAXIMA OF THE CASE-FUNCTION 
“Legal certainty represents the public interest in clear, equal and foreseeable 
rules of law,”26 or, as we have called them, complete and unambiguous rules. 
Having established the relationship with mathematical function maximization, 
we can define legal uncertainty as the amount of global and local maxima of the 
case-function. In cases where the number of maxima is finite, legal uncertainty 
can simply be defined as the number of maxima. Things become more 
complicated if an infinite number of maxima are involved, especially if one wants 
to compare the degree of legal uncertainty of two case-functions having an 
infinite number of maxima. While there are many hypotheticals that make legal 
uncertainty even more complicated, we can suffice here by stating that legal 
uncertainty is related to the number of maxima of the case-function. 
We next propose that judicial decision-making involves finding and 
communicating all maxima of the case-function, which would improve judicial 
decision-making in several respects. 
A. Reduction of Inconsistent Verdicts on Similar Cases 
First, inconsistencies among verdicts by different judges who have ruled on 
similar cases would be reduced. This might seem counterintuitive, as 
communicating multiple decisions can create confusion, but discussing all the 
potential maxima makes explicit what everyone already knows: that the legal 
system does not always provide a unique and unquestionable outcome for a given 
case. 
Now, suppose that Judge X and Judge Y rule on very similar cases. Both have 
determined all maxima, and both have selected what they consider the best 
maximum as the final decision. Of course, if one judge missed certain maxima, 
the best maximum for each judge, and thus their final decisions, may differ. This 
is an irregularity in legal ruling, since the public expects that similar cases should 
result in almost identical decisions. However, if many of the found maxima are 
the same, it holds that the judges’ perspectives on the set of legally permissible 
outcomes are very similar. In other words, the case-function they identified is 
similar, suggesting they have analyzed the case in a similar way. On the other 
hand, if only their different final decisions were communicated through the 
verdict, then one might conclude that their respective legal reasoning is different. 
That is to say, in the traditional view of judicial decision-making, the comparison 
between two verdicts amounts to comparing two outcomes, and they are either 
the same or different. 
 
 
 26.  Magdalena Pfeiffer, Legal Certainty and Predictability in International Succession Law, 12 J. 
PRIV. INT’L L. 566, 566 (2016). 
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In our proposed view, there are a lot more variables to compare: All maxima 
that have been found by Judge X can be compared to all maxima found by Judge 
Y. The more maxima they have in common, the smaller the inconsistency 
between their verdicts. Ideally, their final decisions are the same, but 
inconsistency is still rather low if the final decision by the one judge corresponds 
to an alternative decision by the other judge. 
This subtle difference between legal uncertainty on the one hand, and 
inconsistent or irregular verdicts on the other hand, is very apparent if the 
involved case-functions have a plateau. Even if two judges pick the same plateau, 
it is very possible that their final decision is different. Recall that the plateau 
consists of an infinite number of legally permissible solutions,27 and thus it would 
not be remarkable if two judges picked a different number from the plateau as 
their final decision. Under our approach to judicial decision-making, however, as 
long as their final decision belongs to the same plateau, the two verdicts are 
perfectly consistent. 
 
















B. Counteracting Biases in Judicial Decision-Making 
As outlined previously, biases are highly prevalent in judicial decision-
making. One plausible explanation is that people in general rely on heuristics in 
processing information. Heuristics are defined as “cognitive shortcuts, or rules of 
thumb, by which people generate judgments and make decisions without having 
to consider all the relevant information, relying instead on a limited set of cues 
 
 27.  See Fig. 5. 
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that aid their decision making.”28 Inevitably, judges start the analysis of a case 
from their own background experience and personality, and from their 
interpretation of the law and the given facts. This can be referred to as the initial 
state of that particular judge. 
Once again, there is a connection between the initial state and finding maxima 
of a mathematical function. Many computer algorithms that have been developed 
to perform function maximization also start from an initial state. The initial state 
is a point of the function, often randomly chosen, that is used as the seed point 
by the algorithm, after which heuristic rules are applied to find points nearby the 
initial state that have a higher value. This procedure is repeatedly applied until 
the subsequent values do not grow in magnitude anymore. The final value is then 
a maximum. This is illustrated in Figure 6, which shows an initial state together 
with the direction of subsequent points of increasing value that are selected by 
the algorithm. 
 


















Figure 6 clearly shows that the algorithm will end in a local maximum. By 
applying the heuristic rules, the algorithm proceeds in the direction where the 
points have a higher value, and the global maximum is missed. To reach the 
global maximum, the algorithm would need to apply the counterintuitive 
approach of first passing through many points with a lower (that is, a worse) 
 
 28.  Eyal Peer & Eyal Gamliel, Heuristics and Biases in Judicial Decisions, 49 CT. REV. 114, 114 
(2013). 
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value. Judicial decision-making can be understood in the same way: starting from 
their initial state, judges apply the rules they consider best for the case at hand, 
to gradually arrive at a legally acceptable decision. This will often be a local 
maximum, just as in the algorithmic function maximization. 
This idea is clearly reflected in the phenomenon of anchoring.29 Anchoring 
occurs when judges are highly influenced by certain suggestions of how the case 
might be resolved. One typical example of a suggestion influencing a judge’s 
reasoning is a plaintiffs’ claim for a certain amount of damages.30 Another well-
known anchor is the initial plea offer made by the prosecutor.31 The anchor, 
together with legal experience and personal background, puts judges in a certain 
initial state, from which they start their search for a maximum of the involved 
case-function. 
To avoid being trapped in a local maximum, the best strategy the judge can 
employ is the same one algorithms employ for function maximization. After 
having found a certain maximum from an initial state, a computer algorithm 
simply starts from another initial state, and the same heuristic rule is again 
applied to arrive at another maximum. This procedure can then be repeated a 
predefined number of times, resulting in a set of maxima. Some maxima might 
be equal to each other, particularly when the initial states are similar. Then, the 
maxima can be ranked according to their magnitude, with the largest value 
corresponding to the best maximum. Of course, it is possible the best maximum 
is still a local, rather than global, maximum, but the maximum will not be lower 
than the initial individual maximum. 
The judge is, as a human being, less flexible than a computer algorithm that 
can be easily programmed to search for a maximum from multiple initial states. 
Yet even judges are in a position to vary their initial states by utilizing certain 
mechanisms, such as a what-if strategy. For example, judges may ponder “What 
if I were to adhere to an alternate interpretation of the law?” or “What if a more 
liberal judge than me were to consider this factual situation?” By trying different 
initial states, the judges might arrive at multiple solutions for the case at hand. 
 
 29.  See generally Christoph K. Winter, The Value of Behavioral Economics for EU Judicial 
Decision-Making, 21 German L.J. 240, 264 (2020); Jungwook Kim & Subok Chae, Anchoring Effect of 
the Prosecutor’s Demand on Sentence: Evidence from Korean Sexual Crime Cases, 39 KDI J. ECON. 
POL’Y 1, 18 (2017); Adrian Furnham & Hua Chu Boo, A Literature Review of the Anchoring Effect, 40 J. 
SOCIO-ECON. 35, 42 (2011); Francisca Fariña, Ramón Arce & Mercedes Novo, Anchoring in Judicial 
Decision-Making, 7 PSYCHOL. SPAIN 56, 65 (2003); Yun-chien Chang, Kong-pin Chen, Chang Lin & Yu-
sheng Liu, Anchoring Effect in Real Litigation: An Empirical Study, SSRN ELEC. J. (2016). 
 30.  Mollie W. Marti & Roselle L. Wissler, Be Careful What You Ask For: The Effect of Anchors on 
Personal-Injury Damages Awards, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 91, 94–95 (2000); see 
generally John Campbell, Bernard Chao, Christopher Robertson & David V. Yokum, Countering the 
Plaintff’s Anchor: Jury Simulations to Evaluate Damages Arguments, 101 IOWA L. REV. 543 (2016) 
(explaining that studies show that damage decisions by juries are strongly affected by the plaintiff’s 
requested amount). 
 31.  Colin Miller, Anchors Away: Why the Anchoring Effect Suggests That Judges Should Be Able to 
Participate in Plea Discussions, 54 B.C. L. REV 1667, 1667 (2019); see also Y. Chang et al., supra note 29 
(discussing the effect of anchoring on judicial decision making). 
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Perhaps they consider some of these solutions better than the one initially found. 
They may even attain a global maximum of the case-function that would have 
been overlooked if the search strategy were restricted to one initial state. Trying 
different initial states thereby circumvents the anchoring effect, and perhaps 
many other biases. 
C. Influence on Legislation 
If judges consistently find many maxima for a certain class of case-functions, 
the degree of incompleteness or ambiguity in certain areas of law would become 
more readily apparent. This would indicate a need for legislative intervention, for 
example by introducing additional or more unambiguous rules. Interestingly, the 
success of the legislative intervention is easily measured, at least in principle, by 
comparing the number of maxima that are found by judges after the legislative 
intervention with the number of maxima that predated the legislative 
intervention. 
Thus, judicial decision-making using maxima has advantages for legislation. 
Although a verdict is primarily meant to settle a dispute between litigants, the 
impact of judicial decisions on other actors should not be underrated. Indeed, a 
judicial opinion that underlies a verdict is “simultaneously addressed to several, 
layered audiences: the parties to the case, potential litigants, and even politicians 
and the broader public.”32 Furthermore, as Professor Martin Shapiro expressed, 
“. . . opinions themselves, not who won or lost, are the crucial form of political 
behavior by the appellate courts, since it is the opinions which provide the 
constraining directions to the public and private decision-makers who determine 
99 per cent of the conduct that never reaches the courts.”33 
D. Increasing Transparency 
Communicating multiple legally permissible decisions may be akin to 
expressing uncertainty about how a dispute should be resolved. After all, if the 
alternative decisions are legally permissible, they may have been chosen as the 
final decision by the judge. Yet are explicitly expressed uncertainties truly 
undesirably? In the empirical sciences, it is tradition to express uncertainties 
about outputs generated by a model. In fact, it is a cornerstone of the scientific 
domain that results that are not solid and indisputable should also not be reported 
as such. Philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell expressed that “not to 
be absolutely certain is, I think, one of the essential things in rationality.”34 
Communicating uncertainties actually enhances the credibility in outcomes 
 
 32.  Arthur Dyevre, The Promise and Pitfall of Automated Text-Scaling Techniques for the Analysis 
of Jurisprudential Change, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L., 1, 10 (2020). 
 33.  THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 39 (Martin Shapiro, ed., Free Press, 
1968). 
 34.  BERTRAND RUSSELL, AM I AN ATHEIST OR AN AGNOSTIC? A PLEA FOR TOLERANCE IN THE 
FACE OF NEW DOGMAS (1947). 
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produced by a model.35 
To be sure, reporting uncertainties in scientific results not only delivers 
additional information, but also useful information.36 For example, research has 
shown that visualizing location uncertainty in GPS positioning is beneficial to 
users, as this helps them to better cope with situations arising from GPS 
degradation.37 In the same way, credibility of the judicial decision-making process 
would be increased if courts communicated all legally permissible solutions, 
thereby expressing the uncertainty about the best legal outcome to the case. 
Besides, if machine learning techniques that are applied to judicial decision-
making are required to be transparent,38 should this also not apply to the main 
actors in judicial decision-making? In this respect it is crucial to remark that even 
black boxes, considered to be the most unexplainable type of machine learning 
systems, are able to describe uncertainties about produced outcomes, for 
example by employing the bootstrap method.39 Given this observation, it is hard 
 
 35.  See Kwang-Il Ahn & Young-Ho Jin, A Formal Approach for Quantitative Treatment of Modeling 
Uncertainties in Safety Analysis, 116 NUCLEAR TECH., no. 2, 1996, at 146, 147 (describing the advantages 
of “explicit consideration of modeling uncertainty”). 
 36.  See Joanna IntHout, John Ioannidis, Maroeska Rovers, Jelle Goeman, Plea for Routinely 
Presenting Prediction Intervals in Meta-Analysis, 6 BMJ OPEN, no. 2 at 1, 2 (2016), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2015-010247 [https://perma.cc/BDV4-P5QN]. (“Therefore, 
summarising [sic] the findings of a meta-analysis in a single summary value sacrifices potentially 
informative variation”); L. H. Kaack, Jay Apt, Granger Morgan, Patrick McSharyy, Empirical Prediction 
Intervals Improve Energy Forecasting, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI., no. 33, 2017, at 8752, 8752 
(“Providing information on the likely uncertainty associated with such projections would help individuals 
and organizations use them in a more informed manner.”). 
 37.  See S. Burigat & L. Chittaro, Pedestrian Navigation with Degraded GPS Signal: Investigating the 
Effects of Visualizing Position Uncertainty, PROC. 13TH INT’L CONF. HUM. COMPUT. INTERACTION 
MOBILE DEVICES & SERV., 221–230 (2011) (discussing a study on how visualizations of uncertainty 
assisted users of GPS technology); see generally Petr Aksenov, Kris Luyten, Karin Coninx, O Brother, 
Where Art Thou Located?: Raising Awareness of Variability in Location Tracking for Users of Location-
Based Pervasive Applications, 6 J. LOCATION BASED SERV., 211–233 (2012) (for an overview of location 
uncertainty variation and its impact on users of tracking technology). 
 38.  See R. Yu & G. Spina Alì, What’s Inside the Black Box? AI Challenges for Lawyers and 
Researchers, 19 LEGAL INFO. MGMT. 2, 6–7 (2019) (for a list of possible solutions to AI’s drawbacks, 
including heightened transparency); see M. Buiten, Towards Intelligent Regulation of Artificial 
Intelligence, 10 EUR. J. RISK REGUL., 41, 45 (2019) (“We may thus need new rules to mitigate the risks 
of AI. One proposal is to introduce transparency requirements for AI  . . . “). But see S. Piano, Ethical 
Principles in Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence: Cases from the Field and Possible Ways 
Forward, 7 HUMANITIES & SOC. SCI. COMMC’N 2, 3 (2020) (considering some ethical issues with 
transparency, such as data privacy concerns); SARA GERKE, TIMO MINSSEN, GLENN COHEN, Ethical 
and Legal Challenges of Artificial Intelligence-Driven Healthcare, in ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN 
HEALTHCARE 295, 302–03 (Adam Bohr & Kaveh Memarzadeh eds., 2020) (discussing the ethical 
complications between transparency and privacy concerns). See generally S. Larsson and F. Heintz, 
Transparency in Artificial Intelligence, 9 INTERNET POL’Y REV., no. 2, May 2020 (for a deeper discussion 
of transparency in A.I.); Heike Felzmann, Eduard Villaronga, Christoph Lutz, Transparency You Can 
Trust: Transparency Requirements for Artificial Intelligence Between Legal Norms and Contextual 
Concerns, 6 BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1 (2019) (same). 
 39.  See generally B. EFRON & R. J. TIBSHIRANI, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOTSTRAP (1993). 
See Tomohiro Endo, Tomoaki Watanabe, Akio Yamamoto, Confidence Interval Estimation by Bootstrap 
Method for Uncertainty Quantification Using Random Sampling Method, 52 J. NUCLEAR SCI. & TECH. 
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to consider judges as transparent when they are often reluctant to be explicit 
about the uncertainties in analyzing a case. 
E. Improving the Quality of the Adversarial Procedure 
In an adversarial procedure, the parties are given the chance to present their 
arguments. In most proceedings this does not hinder the judge from deciding a 
case in a way that was not foreseen by the parties, such as issuing a decision 
grounded on legal rules that differ significantly from the ones put forward by the 
parties. The judge who describes all maxima of the case-function ensures a lively 
adversarial debate between the parties, since the parties also are urged to 
thoroughly discuss the case-function. In particular, parties will discuss the 
number of local and global maxima, the presence of plateaus, the function values 
that correspond to the maxima of the case-function, and so forth. Together with 
the judge, the parties will obtain a suitable case-function, resulting in the case 
being analyzed much more in depth compared to traditional judicial decision-
making, where the parties and the judge restrict the discussion to a limited 
number of legally valid solutions. 
 
V 
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN A FICTITIOUS CASE 
In this section we present a fictitious case study that applies the judicial 
decision-making method outlined in this Article. 
A. Factual Situation 
Mr. Jones runs a moving company. Recently, he entered into a contract with 
the Simons family to move all their belongings from their current residence to 
their new villa. The contract stipulates that all possessions will be moved in three 
days, at a price of $1500. There is a damages clause in case he fails to achieve the 
three-day goal, consisting of a lump sum of $800. Furthermore, it is agreed that 
Mr. Jones will start performing the contract on October 26 at 10:30 a.m. 
On October 26 at 10:45 a.m., Mr. Jones is present at the old residence. A 
friend accompanies him, since his plan is to first move the very heavy items. The 
move continues for the next two days. On October 29 at 9:00 a.m., Mr. Jones 
arrives at the old residence to pick up some final small things belonging to the 
Simons family. He is very surprised to see some people waiting outside the house 
whom he has never seen before. They claim to be the new owners, stating that 
they signed a contract with the Simons family that stipulates that they are allowed 
 
993, 998 (2015) (“[I]t is expected that the bootstrap method is applicable to estimate the confidence 
intervals of uncertainties without complicated mathematical procedures in the case of non-normal 
distribution. Furthermore, the bootstrap method has capability to estimate confidence intervals for other 
statistical estimates.”). See generally P. Kirk & M Stumpf, Gaussian Process Regression Bootstrapping: 
Exploring the Effects of Uncertainty in Time Course Data, 25 BIOINFORMATICS 1300 (2009) (for an 
explanation of the bootstrap method’s ability to account for uncertainty, applied here to biology). 
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to move in on October 29 from 8.00 a.m. Mr. Jones quickly collects all the 
remaining items, and hurries to the Simons’ new residence. 
Both Mr. Jones and the Simons claim not to have made any mistake regarding 
the unfortunate state of affairs under the contract. While the Simons argue that 
Mr. Jones should have finished the move by October 28, since October 26-28 
constitutes a three-day period, Mr. Jones replies that one day consists of 24 hours, 
so that he had until October 29 at 10:30 a.m. to move everything. 
B. Judicial Procedure 
A court procedure is subsequently initiated. After hearing the arguments of 
the parties, the judge takes the matter into consideration. The law stipulates that 
in a contract between parties, the intention of the parties dominates, but if their 
intention is unclear, the literal meaning of words is decisive. As the intention of 
the parties is determined to be unknown, the judge relies on the meaning of the 
words. According to a widely accepted dictionary, “day” refers to the time 
between sunrise and sunset, according to which the Simons are right that the 
move should have finished on October 28. However, the same dictionary offers 
as alternative description of “day” as “a division of time equal to 24 hours,” in 
which case Mr. Jones finished his task on time. Certain case law states that if 
contractual matters remain unclear after literal interpretation, the clause should 
be interpreted against the professional, at least in situations where the contract is 
concluded between a professional and a non-professional. This case law is 
criticized, since there is no legal basis to apply such a rule. However, lacking any 
other criterion to decide on this point of contention, the final decision of the judge 
is that Mr. Jones should have finished his contractual obligations on October 28. 
According to the damage clause, he is obliged to pay $800 to the Simons. 
However, the law stipulates that the judge can reduce a damage clause if the 
specified amount is considered out of proportion to the actual damage. The judge 
considers $800 too high, given that the total cost of the move was $1500 and that 
Mr. Jones finished his job the following morning. He reduces the damage clause 
to an amount of $200, although he is convinced that any amount from $100 to 
$250 would also have been reasonable. 
C. Verdict 
The judge applies the new method of judicial decision-making, so he 
considers and communicates all legally permissible outcomes. His verdict, taking 
into account the considerations of the previous subsection, is summarized as 
follows: 
Concerning the performance of the contract: 
Final decision: Mr. Jones failed to perform the contract on time, since the 
contract stipulated to finish the task in three days, and Mr. Jones did not do so. 
Alternate decision: Mr. Jones performed the contract on time based on an 
alternative definition of “day.” 
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Complete set of decisions: YES/NO concerning the timely execution of the 
contract. 
Concerning the damage clause: 
Final decision: Mr. Jones has to pay damages, but the amount of $800 in the 
contract is reduced to $200. 
Alternate decision 1: Mr. Jones has to pay damages for any other amount 
between $100 and $250. 
Alternate decision 2: Mr. Jones does not have to pay any damages, if the 
alternative interpretation of “a day” is accepted. 
Complete set of decisions: $0 or [$100, $250] has to be paid by Mr. Jones. 
*** 
It is clear that this verdict is much more informative than a traditional 
judgment in which only one final decision is communicated. The alternate 
decisions presented together with the final decision provide an extensive legal 
analysis of the case at hand. Even though only the final decision is relevant for 
enforcement of the judgment, the comprehensive court decision ensures that the 
judge has considered all legally permissible rules. Not only did he consider all 





Legal practitioners tend to consider machine learning black boxes as 
synonymous with models that provide only a single produced outcome. Yet, such 
models can report an optimal solution with a set of alternative solutions that are 
also plausible, like the set of all reasonable predictions for a given forecast 
problem. 
Judicial decision makers operate in a remarkably similar setting. The factual 
situation is frequently vaguely described by the parties, while the legal system is 
ambiguous and incomplete. The result is that there is typically no clear legal 
outcome to similar cases. If judges are expected to be at least as transparent as 
black boxes, they should communicate all reasonable legally valid solutions. In 
terms of the relationship with mathematical function maximization judges should 
identify and consider all maxima, whether local or global, of the case-function. 
Although our Article has focused on judicial decision-making, there is 
another particular application where our conceptualization of finding legal 
solutions to a given case is of main relevance. Lawyers giving legal advice might 
benefit from our proposed method of constructing legally valid solutions. 
Lawyers might even use our conceptual underpinnings to visualize the possible 
legal outcomes for a case described by a client. More concretely, clients might be 
presented a function with global and local maxima, such that they can easily grasp 
the complexity of the case, the number of legally admissible solutions, and the 
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legal validity of solutions represented by the values of the corresponding maxima. 
In short, lawyers have completely and thoroughly analyzed a case when they have 
constructed the corresponding case-functions. 
As a critique against our new judicial decision-making method, if the global 
maximum of a case-function is a plateau, the judge may pick any of the points 
lying on the plateau as the legally optimal decision. It might be useful to improve 
our conceptualization by adding other techniques that may be used to select 
points on a plateau. For example, one method is to describe optimal decision in 
terms of minimizing costs and maximizing benefits.40 A prison sentence might be 
considered in terms of balancing costs and benefits, where costs related to 
adverse effects on the defendants and his family, while benefits relate to ensuring 
that the defendant cannot commit a crime as long as he is in jail. Specifying the 
costs and benefits allows the judges to determine a unique optimal solution. 
While our method might be used to identify a plateau as the legally best verdict 
(containing a range of lengths of imprisonment), other optimization methods 
could be used to subsequently select a unique length of imprisonment in terms of 
predefined costs and benefits. 
Another critique is that it might result in an increase in the workload of 
judges, which is especially alarming given that courts around the world often face 
budgetary constraints and barely have time to thoroughly construe a single legal 
outcome, let alone a range of decisions. Although there is no doubt that our 
proposed method of judicial decision-making will increase the workload of judges 
at first, it is not obvious that the total time to handle a case, including the time to 
decide an appeal, will be increased. Since the judges will have constructed the 
case-function at the beginning of the case, thereby thoroughly describing all 
legally valid decisions, the court of appeal will strongly benefit from the 
additional work performed by the initial judges. The additional workload for 
judges is also compensated by all the other benefits of this new method of judicial 
decision-making.41 
Finally, the methodology described in this Article might equally be 
considered a premature tool that will turn out to be of important use only in a 
future era, when artificial intelligence will have a major impact in the legal 
context. The time to construct the set of legally valid decisions will then be 
reduced dramatically, and the case-function might be considered a transparent 
and visually attractive concept by litigants, produced in no time by sophisticated 
artificial intelligence tools. 
 
 
 40.  See generally H. Lakkaraju & C. Rudin, Learning Cost-Effective and Interpretable Treatment 
Regimes, PROC. 20TH INT’L CONF. A.I. & STAT., 166 (2017) (for a proposal on how to automate decisions 
that are made based on weighing costs and benefits). 
 41.  See supra Part I. 
